INTRODUCTION
Disabilities systems are complex. Legal systems are complex. When the two are combined, the complexity is increased exponentially. Remarkably, there has been little scholarly attention paid to this important phenomenon. In this paper, we consider some of the difficulties of navigating two targets that often seem to be moving in opposite directions, of addressing a question that, to the best of our knowledge, has never previously been addressed. Consider these preliminary thoughts. For these purposes, "the law" includes many different areas: criminal law and procedure (among others, the relationship between mental disability and the incompetency status, the insanity defense, sentencing, and statuses such as that of one being a persistent sex offender); civil rights law (the rights of persons with disabilities to adequate treatment, to aftercare, to refuse the imposition of unwanted antipsychotic medication, and the scope of anti-discrimination law); international human rights law (its interrelationship with domestic law and the extent to which the latter needs to be modified if it conflicts with the former); benefits law (social welfare, veterans' laws, more), and the relationship between mental disabilities and other areas of the law (family law, private civil law [separately, looking at tort law, contracts law, trusts and estates law], sexual autonomy, and others). 1 t Michael L. Perlin, Esq. is a Professor Emeritus at Law at New York Law School and an Adjunct Professor at the Emory University School of Law. He is the Founding Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project, and Co-Founder of the Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. Mehgan Gallagher, Esq. is a Law Fellow at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. Portions of this article were written during the time when one of the co-authors (Mr. Perlin) was an international visiting scholar at RMIT Law School, Melbourne, Australia, March-April 2017. An earlier draft was presented by the same co-author as a "master class" to the School of Social and Political Science, University of Melbourne, April 5, 2017. Our thanks to Professor Penny Weller for inspiring this piece.
1. For an overview of most of these as they relate to mental disability, see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN For these purposes, "disability" also includes many different statuses: from one perspective, psychosocial disability, intellectual disability, those with dual diagnoses; from another, the extent and the severity of the disability, and its impact on the person in question; from yet another, whether the person with a disability is in the community or an institution (or, if in the community, in danger of being institutionalized). 2 One example of conflict: antidiscrimination law can make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire someone with a disability, but many governments will only provide benefits (including health care and insurance) if a person proves complete disability, thus prohibiting him or her from working. 3 Anti-discrimination laws are based on social models of disability; social benefits laws often on the (discarded-in-international-law) medical model. 4 Virtually no attention has been paid to these conflicts in cases involving criminal prosecutions.
Making this assignment even more challenging is an assumption that governs much of the literature about the relationship between these two systems: that when questions of disability are considered in the context of the legal system, the person at risk has counsel that is competent to represent her. This is the ultimate assumption of a fact-not-in-evidence; it is one that one of the co-authors (Mr. Perlin) has written about in many other contexts, 5 but has never before considered in this sense.
POL' Y & L. 114 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin & Dorfman, Wastin' Time] . 6 . See, e.g., Perlin, Your Funeral, supra note 5, at 241. 7. See, e.g., Perlin, Executioner's Face, supra note 5, at 201. 8. See, e.g., Winsor C. Schmidt, Guardianship for Vulnerable Adults in North Dakota: Recommendations Regarding Unmet Needs, Statutory Efficacy, and Cost Effec- tiveness, 89 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 77, 77 (2013 
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW signed the worst lawyer."' 0 Additionally, the reporters are replete with cases in which lawyers in guardianship cases provided pitifully inadequate counsel.
I "
In this paper, we will attempt to "tease out" some of the main threads in this discourse in the following manner.
First, we will consider the hopelessness of conceptualizing "law" as a single system, especially when it comes to dealing with questions of disability, using the topic of criminal incompetency as an example,' 2 and then looking at these questions in the specific context of international human rights law.' 3 Then, we will look at the futility of seeking to create a uniform view of a "disability" system, as that phrase has little meaningful content, given the range of disabilities, the range of attitudes towards persons with different disabilities, and the futility of trying to come up with a single formulation that would cover individuals in the community and those institutionalized.'
4 After this, we will consider the role of lawyers in both of these systems, and how the "wild card" of sanism ultimately controls the extent to which these two systems can ever be meaningfully navigated.1 5
Finally, we will consider the potential impact of the school of law and policy known as "therapeutic jurisprudence," and how a turn to therapeutic jurisprudence might, optimally, offer us a solution. First, consider the "war" between those who support the "empowering idea that people with disabilities can and should work once discriminatory societal barriers are removed,"
19 and those who "treat people with disabilities through a medical model, seeking to objectively evaluate whether their medical situation entitles them to governmental benefits. '20 Professor Michael Waterstone has explicitly referred to this as a reflection of the ways that "Federal laws and policies as they relate to the employment of people with disabilities are at war with themselves. '2 1 Then, think about how the complexity of the laws in this area-and the generally ineffective level of counsel made available to persons with disabilities-causes any reasonable on-looker to "moan." Finally, consider the "temptation" of allowing ourselves to fall into the trap of believing that the systems in question are somehow easy to maneuver. If we so succumb, we "[fly] out the door," and our hopes of truly navigating these contradictory systems will disappear.
I. THE "LEGAL" SYSTEM
First, when we discuss the legal system in this paper, we are not talking about one legal system; rather, we are talking about many. The parable about the group of blind men and the elephant-each blind man touches a different part of the elephant's body and then incorrectly proclaims that the 
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BuFFALo HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW entire elephant resembles his section 22 -has been quoted in hundreds of law review articles and cases, and likely comes to us from a Buddhist fable. 23 It has been quoted by, among others, former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, while writing about environmental issues. 24 It has also been used to explain the radically different views among the American public about the O.J. Simpson trial. 25 However, we do not believe it has ever been invoked in a discussion of what we are discussing here-how our views of "the legal system" depend on which part of the legal system we are examining, an especially important issue in the context of disability law. As we have noted, there are at least five overarching areas that need to be considered: the criminal law system, the civil rights law system, the international human rights law system, the public benefits law system, and the private law system. Each system is complex, and each must be navigated carefully in matters involving litigants with disabilities.
In this paper, we will address only one aspect of one of these systems. 26 In the criminal law system, we will examine the question of criminal competencies, a category that extends far beyond the typically focused on question of fitness to proceed to trial. 27 Importantly, this is not a topic generally on the research or policy agenda of persons who characterize themselves as "disability rights activists. '28 The authors' decision to so limit their focus should in no way suggest that the other systems (or the remainder of the criminal law system) are not important. We think these other systems are vitally important and that the same points we seek to make about this system will apply, in parallel ways, to those as well. Of course, none of these systems stand alone. In many important ways, they are interconnected, and must be looked at in the context of the other systems.
We start with criminal law. Within this one "system," there are multiple systems to navigate in the context of criminal defendants who may have 29 These systems include: the system of competency statuses, the system of criminal responsibility determinations, the system of sentencing (and the production of mitigating evidence), and the system of determining whether an individual is a sexually violent predator. Each of these raises discrete, complex, conceptual, strategic, and ethical issues that must be "gotten" by practitioners and judges if adequate representation is to be provided to the individual at risk.
Again, we limit ourselves here to questions of competency. The standard for competency to stand trial in the United States is, on paper, fairly straight forward. The question to be asked is whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and whether he has a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. ' Judicial decisions in these latter areas appear to all be the classic "n of 1"; judges decide these cases without paying much attention to other similar cases that have been decided in other jurisdictions, "surpris[ingly]" failing "to consider carefully" other decisions in the same substantive sub-areas of 29. We use "mental disability" to subsume both these characterizations. Of course, there are many defendants whose diagnoses overlap the two. 668, 713-14 (1984) . See also Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 5, at 53-54 (characterizing the "Strickland standard as 'sterile and perfunctory' where 'reasonably effective assistance' is objectively measured by the 'prevailing professional norms"').
40. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 498 (2001) ; but see Matter of J.S., 401 P. 3d 197 (Mont. 2017) Finally, we are just beginning to understand the scope of a dilemma that has been under the radar for far too long. 44 Merely raising the incompetency status is often a perilous decision. One of the most vexing ethical issues that criminal attorneys face is whether to raise the issue of competency, and by extension, whether to raise the issue of competency over the defendant's objection. 45 There are multiple reasons why an effective and competent defense lawyer might not raise the question of incompetency, among them being the subsequent lack of availability of bail, the conditions of institutionalization at the referral hospital, and the possible iatrogenic or ameliorative impact of psychiatric institutionalization on the defendant.
46
Josephine Ross has suggested that an "ethic of care" might call for disregarding incompetency concerns, 47 and Christopher Slobogin and Amy
Mashburn underscore that the raise-or-not-raise decision is necessarily a "nuanced" one. 48 In a particularly thoughtful piece, Keri Gould has described that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel may ethically 
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support the decision to ignore the competency question entirely. 49 This issue is of special importance in the case of defendants charged with petty offenses who face little or no jail time if convicted, but may be institutionalized for years in maximum security facilities once the status issue is raised.
0
The stakes are raised here because of the reality that, when the incompetency status is raised in a criminal case, "many lawyers also [often] impute a blanket incompetency in all aspects of life decision-making to such clients. '5 1 Thus, the late Bruce Winick and his colleagues have suggested that, in view of this reality and the negative psychological effects of incompetency labeling, criminal attorneys can help their clients interpret that legal label in a way that "minimizes the risk of adverse psychological consequences. ' '52 This contrasts-totally-with the ways that lawyers must navigate the disability law system, in which they often must assert their client's complete disability, 53 an assertion that, inevitably, often brings with it a claim of incompetency.
54
Also, we need to consider the constellation of issues raised when the state seeks to involuntarily medicate an incompetent defendant in order to make him competent to stand trial, 55 
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The circumstances under which persons with serious mental illnesses find themselves in jail are dismal. Jail staff workers often have no education or training in the appropriate treatment of detainees with a mental illness; often, they respond aggressively, thus exacerbating the symptoms exhibited by the detainees in question. 63 Many individuals with a mental illness are disciplined or placed in solitary confinement rather than being afforded adequate treatment. 64 Additionally, persons with mental disabilities are often forcibly medicated in jails and prisons. 65 However, even when treatment is administered with good intentions, it often leaves a powerful, sometimes lasting effect on the patient. For example, psychotropic medications are known to affect the mind, intellectual functions, perception, moods, and emotions. 66 In short, once the incompetent defendant is jailed pending trial, a constellation of issues emerge that must be considered if we are to come to grips with the inherent policy and behavioral contradictions (premised on disability) that underpin this area of the law. L. 181, 191, 193, 196 (2005 
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BuFFALo HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW notwithstanding the fact (or perhaps because of the fact) that so little consideration of the Convention's application to this population has yet appeared in the literature.
73
The Convention firmly endorses a social model of disability and reconceptualizes mental health rights as disability rights-a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law.
74
"The Convention. . .sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities.
' 75 It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with mental illnesses," 76 and mandates prescriptive rights in addition to proscrip- 
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW GCs... is the single most wrongheaded (and potentially destructive) statement uttered by any supporter of the CRPD since its initial drafting. '85 Nothing in this CRPD article offers the slightest shred of support to the abolition of the incompetency status. First, international human rights have, for decades, included the right to a fair trial. 86 The trial of a person who cannot comprehend what is going on or who cannot cooperate with her counsel cannot be a fair trial. Articulation of the incompetency status in no way indicates factual guilt. 87 But if a defendant cannot articulate to her lawyer what her defense is, what other witnesses might be able to shed light on in relation to the underlying facts, or what her relationship with the alleged victim was, then it is incomprehensible to think that in all but the rarest cases such a trial will lead to an acquittal.
Second, the Comment does not address the critical question of what happens if such a person chooses to waive counsel and represent herself. Such self-representation at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct her defense without the assistance of counsel. 8 8 The trial of an incompetent defendant mocks any definition of dignity; this is one of the basic tenets of the CRPD.
Third, even assuming there is any textual support within Article 14 for this tortured reading, it is black-letter law that any piece of legislation must be read in pari materia. 8 9 It is axiomatic that a statute "must, to the extent possible, ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." 90 Consider again other articles of the CRPD: mandating "[r]espect for inherent dignity"; 91 "[fireedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-85. Perlin, supra note 64, at 480. Corrections officials at times needlessly and punitively deluge them with chemical sprays; shock them with electric stun devices; strap them to chairs and beds for days on end; break their jaws, noses, ribs; or leave them with lacerations, second degree bums, deep bruises, and damaged internal organs. The violence can traumatize already vulnerable men and women, aggravating their symptoms and making future mental health treatment more difficult. In some cases, including several documented in this report, the use of force has caused or contributed to prisoners' deaths.
See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword Mean Dying by the

97
In a recent article on restoration of competency practices, Professor Susan McMahon focuses on the status of such individuals in jail settings:,: "Unable to follow the strict rules and regulations of a jail environment, they are punished by corrections officials and targeted by fellow in- (2015) , available at <https:// www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/12/callous-and-cruel/use-force-against-inmates-mentaldisabilities-us-jails-and>.
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW mates... [T] hey are relegated to solitary confinement and subject to abuse and neglect in far greater numbers than non-mentally-ill detainees. '98 In short, when seeking to navigate the criminal justice system in the context of the variables on which we focus in this article, this navigation must be done with an eye toward the international human rights system to avoid the peril in which the position taken by some in the disability rights community would place the population in question.
II. THE DISABILITY SYSTEM
Consider now the questions that relate to navigation of the disability system. As already noted, there are also multiple disability "systems." Here, we focus on the incompatibility of the disability law "system" that flows from international human rights, and the one that flows from social benefits law. In many ways, these two systems are in direct opposition to each other, and it is essential that we see the contradictions if we are to better understand the "bigger picture." 99 International human rights law repudiates the medical model that has driven the disability system for centuries. 1 00 For example, the CRPD flatly rejects this view of the relationship between persons with disability and society.' 0 ' It "responds to traditional models, situates disability within a social model framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities."' ' 02 It provides a framework for ensuring that 98. McMahon, supra note 50, at 13. 99. Beyond the scope of this.article is an extended consideration of how we react to different sorts of disabilities. We note here only that the valid and reliable research is clear: people with mental disabilities-historically, among the most excluded members of society, are subject to greater prejudice than are people with physical disabilities. This repudiation of the medical model demonstrates, in Professor Gerard Quinn's eloquent phrase, the way that the CRPD provides a "moral compass for change," reflecting a "paradigm shift" in the way that we think about and treat persons with disabilities." 1 05 There is no disputing Professor Penelope Weller's conclusion that it illustrates "profound shifts both in the conception of human rights and the implementation of human rights in public policy domains."
SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS
Contrarily, if one is, say, seeking government benefits because their disability interferes with their ability to gain paid employment, such a person must rely on the medical model to offer proof that they are unableeither for physical or mental reasons-to work. This model "casts people 
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Indeed, many U.S. public assistance and health insurance programs have been criticized for creating incentives for people to not return to work.
0 8
There is no disputing Professor Matthew Diller's conclusion that such social welfare policies "reflect a series of uneasy compromises between competing principles."' 1 9 As Professor Ani Satz has noted, "The Social Security Act fragments the disability experience in another significant way. Individuals with disabilities must often choose between employment (and civil rights protections in employment) and social support."'
110
Another important international document relevant to the human rights of persons with trauma-related disabilities is the WHO International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).
111 The ICF-the "WHO framework for measuring health and disability at both individual and population levels"-was officially endorsed "as the international standard to describe and measure health and disability" by all the 191 WHO Member States at the Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly in May 2001.112
The ICF acknowledges that every individual is capable of experiencing at least some degree of disability throughout their lifetime, whether it be through a change in health or environment, 113 and that "disability is a universal human experience, sometimes permanent, sometimes transient" and is not restricted to a small portion of the population."l 4 Again, this international human rights approach is radically different from the systems in place in many domestic jurisdictions. It is necessary for one of the authors (Mr. Perlin) to personalize this analysis and share how he has dealt with this issue in the days that he was a 107. Waterstone, supra note 19, at 1087. 108. Id. at 1089 (citing, inter alia, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (2004) REv. 361, 361 (1996) . The ways in which laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act have been conceived of as "welfare reform" rather than as civil rights are critiqued in Hirschmann, supra note 74. REv. 298, 298-99 (1976) . In Souder v. Brennan, the court had held that patient-workers at public psychiatric hospitals were "employees" within coverage of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, notwithstanding the claim that the work in question was therapeutic . See Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 811-15 (D.D.C. 1973 REv. 65, 67 (2000) .
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW cations for SSI and SSDI benefits. To adequately represent their clients, the student attorneys needed to demonstrate that their clients were sufficiently disabled so as to qualify for benefits.' 2 ' To do so, they sought to amass expert evidence that would attest to the extent of their disability. In other words, to satisfy federal administrative and statutory law, they needed to show that their clients were fully medically disabled. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) . See also Samuel Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism, Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 413, 430 (2017) (explaining that "disability rights advocates cannot abandon disability-based benefits"); Burke & Barnes, supra note 101, at 101 (noting that such benefits programs "reflect a medical model of disability that is at odds with the social model"). Therapeutic Jurisdiction them to have provided adequate representation to their clients had they not, for these purposes, "bought into" the medical model.
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
126
But we believe it is impossible for lawyers to provide adequate and effective representation to persons with disabilities without embracing the social model. Since, to the best of our knowledge, there has been almost no consideration of the impact of the social model on benefits law, it is necessary that practitioners and scholars start taking seriously the way these systems conflict. One example of this conflict is the "tension between the obligation to work and the desire to aid those in need."' 127 According to Professor Diller:
History demonstrates that programs that seek to cast a broad net by relying on inclusive definitions of disability aid more individuals but are less likely to provide a package of benefits that is markedly superior to those offered to the poor generally. On the other hand, programs that emphasize exclusion by relying on narrow definitions of disability aid fewer people but are more likely to provide benefits on dignified and non-punitive terms. This dynamic does not stem simply from the economic equation that, absent lower benefits, broader programs are costlier. Rather, inclusive definitions of disability highlight the fact that disability is not easily separable from other putative "causes" of chronic unemployment. Narrow definitions obscure this difficulty by presenting disability as a status that is medically given, rather than socially constructed.
128
The medical model of disability looks at disability as a "problem" that belongs to the disabled individual, forcing the individual to make accommodations in order to adapt to the environment. 129 The medical model. views disability as something that needs to be corrected. 1 30 Alternatively, the social model (the view to which the authors adhere) looks at disability 
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW as something affecting society as a whole, and puts the burden on societyrather than the individual-to adapt.' 3 ' The medical model sounds in pathology;
13 2 it views a person in a wheelchair as the problem, while the social model views the stairs obstructing wheelchair access to a building as the problem that society is responsible for fixing. 133 It is imperative that lawyers take a holistic approach to representing all clients-but particularly those with mental disabilities. Counsel must recognize that there is no "one size fits all" approach to disability; thus, each client should be treated on an individual basis, identifying their needs, wants, and circumstances to provide effective representation that is in line with the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and human rights discussed throughout this article. 3) It is essential that there be a "wake up" call for lawyers so that it will be more likely that authentic representation be provided, something that can best be done through dedicated offices of welltrained trained stand-alone lawyers. 4) We must confront the pervasive stench of sanism that totally contaminates the entire legal process in cases involving persons with disabilities.
We cannot overestimate the impact of these realities on all the questions we have raised here.
First, there is no question as to the inadequacy of counsel assigned to represent persons with disabilities in most jurisdictions.
1 37 Nearly a decade ago, Mr. Perlin concluded "if there has been any constant in modern mental disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the near-universal reality that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective."
138 Over twenty years ago, Mr. Perlin pointed out that a Presidential Commission on Mental Health noted the frequently substandard level of representation made available to mentally disabled criminal defendants, adding, "Nothing that has happened in the past two decades has been a palliative for this problem."' 39 In many jurisdic-' tions, such counsel is "woefully inadequate-disinterested, uninformed,
135.
For a recent analysis of the abject lack of adequacy of counsel in death penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities, see Perlin et al., supra note 10.
136. Many are startled to learn that in some U.S. jurisdictions, there is no absolute right to counsel in cases that may result in "sexually violent predators" being incarcerated in prison-like maximum security facilities for life. See, e.g Second, perilously few jurisdictions have chosen to follow the examples of New York, New Jersey, and a handful of other American states that legislatively created regularized, dedicated, and specialized legal services offices whose primary job is to provide representation to persons with mental disabilities at involuntary civil commitment hearings. 4 3 Even today, in the highly-charged area of sexual predator civil commitment law,' 4 many states in the U.S. make no provision for counsel, basing their inaction on the (false) premise that these are civil and not criminal cases. 45 The right to counsel at each stage in the commitment process is not automatically granted and has been denied during pre-commitment evaluations, as well as during the psychological evaluation for the annual review hearing. 146 We were stunned to read in Australian legal aid lawyer Eleanore Fritze's recent brilliant monograph that only a minority of Australian citizens are granted a right to counsel when they appear before the Mental Health Review Tribunal in that nation. Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 REV. (1998 .
146. Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity, supra note 5, at 303; Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 888 A.2d 507, 511 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (holding that a sex offender had no due process right to review materials or meet with a committee addressing his possible referral to the state's attorney general for commitment as a sexually violent predator). 
Therapeutic Jurisdiction
Third, we must acknowledge that, without a cadre of trained, dedicated, advocacy-focused counsel, it is impossible to aspire to any meaningful level of ameliorative change in this area. Only the appointment and continued presence of such lawyers can make it possible for meaningful law reform in all aspects of commitment and institutional rights law to take place. 149 Without the assignment of such counsel, meaningful and ameliorative change is almost impossible to achieve. 150 Fourth, it is impossible to understand why this happens the way it does without understanding the significance of what we call "sanism." We believe it is impossible to understand anything we are discussing today without an understanding of this invidious "ism." Sanism infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices; it is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and reflects the assumptions that are made by the legal system about persons with mental disabilities-who they are, how they got that way, what makes them different, what there is about them that lets society treat them differently, and whether their condition is immutable. These assumptions-those that reflect societal fears and apprehensions about mental disability, persons with mental disabilities, and the possibility that any individual may become mentally disabled-ignore the most important question of all: why do we feel the way we do about "these people" (quotation marks understood)? 151 We can make no headway whatsoever in understanding why the navigation of the systems we have discussed is so difficult unless we come to grips with sanism.
